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This paper explores the potential usefulness of an applied general equilibrium model with 
the Melitz-type trade specification to assess economic effects of technical regulations, 
taking the case of the European Union (EU) End-of-Life Vehicles/Restriction of Hazardous 
Substances (ELV/RoHS) directives as an example. Simulation experiments reveal that: (1) 
raising the fixed exporting cost to make sales in the EU market brings interesting results 
that exports of the targeted commodities (motor vehicles and parts for ELV and electronic 
equipment for RoHS) to the EU from outside regions/countries expand while the domestic 
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Ardelean (2006) suggests; (2) if the PfV is not strong, policy changes that may bring 
reduction in the number of firms enable survived producers with high productivity to 
expand production to be large-scale mass producers fully enjoying the fruit of economies of 
scale; and (3) When the strength of the importer’s PfV is changed from zero to unity, there 
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1. Introduction 
 
Modeling non-tariff barriers (NTBs) has long been a challenge for builders of applied 
general equilibrium (AGE) models, since NTBs are not straightforwardly connectable to 
economic variables included in a model unlike taxes or tariffs, in addition to the fact that 
information on NTBs is not easy to collect, sort out complication, or quantitatively measure. 
Non-tariff measures are introduced in order not only to protect local industries, but also to 
regulate the domestic market. In consequence, NTBs may generate different kinds of 
economic effects, i.e., protection effects as well as supply- and demand-shifting effects 
(Fugazza and Maur (2008)). Protection effects may be generated by measures which restrict 
trade raising cost. Supply-shifting effects may be caused by regulations which specify and 
affect production processes, such that prevent the sales of hazardous products and create 
standards to increase compatibility and interoperability. Demand-shifting effects may be 
brought by rules which affect consumers' behaviors, such that obligate to provide certain 
information related to the sold commodity. 
     Protection effects can be assessed by two different approaches. One approach uses 
ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) estimates of NTBs based on the difference between the world 
price and the domestic price in the importing or exporting country, which has been adopted 
by previous AGE analyses, such as Andriamananjara, Ferrantino and Tsigas (2003) and 
Fugazza and Maur (2008). Another one focuses on the additional cost of production that 
firms have to bear in order to export to a specific market. This kind of cost is considered by 
the seminal work of Melitz (2003) where within-industry resource allocation among 
heterogeneous firms plays an important role. The purpose of this study is to show the 
usefulness of an AGE model with the Melitz-type trade specification to assess economic 
effects of technical regulations, taking the case of the European Union (EU) End-of-Life 
Vehicles/Restriction of Hazardous Substances (ELV/RoHS) directives as an example. We 
also explore cases when demand-shifting effects incur, changing the importer's preference 
for variety (PfV), to show some points need to be paid attention. 
     Ardelean (2006) explored how strong the PfV is, and found that consumer’s PfV is 
around 40 percent lower than the one assumed in the Krugman’s model. In this paper, we 
clarify some of the behavioral characteristics of a sample AGE model with the Melitz-type 
trade specification changing the strength of PfV. Simulation experiments reveal that: (1) 
raising the fixed exporting cost to make sales in the EU market brings reasonable results 
that exports of the targeted commodities (motor vehicles and parts for ELV and electronic 
equipment for RoHS) to the EU from outside regions shrink while the domestic trade in the 
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member countries of the EU expands when the importer’s PfV is strong as assumed in the 
theoretical model by Melitz (2003); (2) those who are better off when the importer’s PfV is 
strong are the regions/countries successful in expanding domestic trade, intra-regional trade, 
or inter-regional trade with a non-EU region/country replacing the shrunk exports to the 
EU; (3) raising the fixed exporting cost to make sales in the EU market brings interesting 
results that exports of the targeted commodities (motor vehicles and parts for ELV and 
electronic equipment for RoHS) to the EU from outside regions expand while the domestic 
trade in the member countries of the EU shrinks when the importer’s PfV is not strong as 
Ardelean (2006) suggests; (4) if the PfV is not strong, policy changes that may bring 
reduction in the number of firms enable survived producers with high productivity to 
expand production to be large-scale mass producers fully enjoying the fruit of economies of 
scale; and (5) When the value of the strength of the importer’s PfV is changed from zero to 
unity, there is the value that totally changes simulation results and their interpretations. 
     The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the sample 
AGE model with the Melitz-type trade specification, which becomes the base of the 
analysis. In Section 3, we perform simulations with the model which is extended to include 
an explicit parameter to control the strength of PfV, and verify the results. Then, Section 4 
concludes this paper. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
In this section, we overview the sample AGE model with the Melitz-type trade 
specification used in this study. The global economy consists of six regions/countries 
indexed ݎ (source) and ݏ (destination), which are linked through trade flows: (r01) the 
EU; (r02) the United States of America (USA); (r03) Japan; (r04) China; (r05) ASEAN; 
and (r06) rest of the world (ROW). Commodities and activities respectively indexed ݅ and 
݆ are categorized into five kinds: (i01) the primary industries; (i02) services; (i03) motor 
vehicles and parts; (i04) electronic equipment; and (i05) other manufacturing. Sectors i03 
through i05 are assumed to be imperfectly competitive with increasing returns to scale 
(IRTS), while the other two are characterized by constant returns to scale (CRTS). Sector 
i01 uses a sector specific factor, such as land and natural resources, in addition to capital, 
labor, and intermediate goods in its production process. Sector i02 provides a fraction of its 
output as the inter-regional transportation supply. 
     An important feature of the model is that firms in the manufacturing sector are 
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divided into two segments that respectively take charge of production and sales. In the 
production process, the production segment of firms collectively determines sector-wide 
input levels of intermediate goods and primary factors, and the output volume, based on 
CRTS technologies. Then, the product is wholesaled to the sales segment. The sales 
segment consists of many dealers/merchants, those who have market power to determine 
the sales price of the commodity in local markets. The scale economy enters here. 
 
2.1 Production 
 
Composite Commodity for Intermediate Input: First, the unified production segment of 
firms in sector ݆ in region ݎ determines input levels of commodity ݅ for intermediate use 
௜ܺ௝௥ to minimize cost subject to a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) technology. The 
problem can be expressed as 
 min ∑ ݌௜௥௜ ௜ܺ௝௥ 
 s.t. ෨ܺ௝௥ ൌ ߠ௝௥௑ ቊ∑ ߙ௜௝௥௑௜ ௜ܺ௝௥
ቀఙೕ೉ିଵቁ ఙೕ೉ൗ ቋ
ఙೕ೉ ቀఙೕ೉ିଵቁൗ
  ٣ ݌௝௥௑ , (1) 
where 
 ݌௜௥  is the market price of commodity ݅  in region ݎ , inclusive of export 
duty/subsidy, transportation margin, and import tariff, 
 ݌௝௥௑  is price index for the composite commodity for intermediate input by sector 
݆ in region ݎ, 
 ෨ܺ௝௥ is quantity of composite commodity for intermediate input by sector ݆ in 
region ݎ, 
 ߪ௝௑ is the elasticity of substitution between commodities, 
 ߙ௜௝௥௑  is the share parameter that reflects requirements of commodity ݅ to form 
෨ܺ௝௥, and 
 ߠ௝௥௑  is the scaling factor of the measuring units.1 
The perpendicular symbol ‘ ٣’ ‘shows the corresponding relationship between variable and 
an equation. The first order condition (FOC) for optimization is 
                                                     
1 This parameter is needed to pass the replication test, which verifies whether an AGE model can reproduce 
the state captured by the benchmark data when there is no policy change (the reference run). For example, 
consider the case in which a data set that includes expenditures for two kinds of commodities, 1 and 1, and 
total expenditure 2. If we assume a Cobb-Douglas type function to aggregate these two commodities to make a 
composite good, we need to equate 2 with 1଴.ହ ∙ 1଴.ହ. In this example, the scaling factor ߠ ൌ 2 is required 
to satisfy 2 ൌ ߠ ∙ 1଴.ହ ∙ 1଴.ହ. 
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 ݌௜௥ ൌ ߙ௜௝௥௑ ݌௝௥௑ ൫ߠ௝௥௑൯ቀఙೕ
೉ିଵቁ ఙೕ೉ൗ ൬௑෨ೕೝ௑೔ೕೝ൰
ଵ ఙೕ೉⁄
   ٣ ௜ܺ௝௥. (2) 
 
Value-Added: The unified production segment of firms in sector ݆ in region ݎ also 
determines input levels of primary factor ௔ܸ௝௥  to minimize cost subject to a CES 
technology. Three kinds of the primary factor, capital, labor, and the one specific to the 
primary industries, are indexed ܽ. The problem can be expressed as 
 min ∑ ∑ ݓ௔௥௝௔ ௔ܸ௝௥ 
 s.t. ௝ܻ௥ ൌ ߠ௝௥௒ ቊ∑ ߙ௔௝௥௒௔ ௔ܸ௝௥
ቀఙೕೊିଵቁ ఙೕೊൗ ቋ
ఙೕೊ ቀఙೕೊିଵቁൗ
  ٣ ݌௝௥௒ , (3) 
where 
 ݓ௔௥ is rental rate of the primary factor ܽ in region ݎ, 
 ݌௝௥௒  is price index for value-added by sector ݆ in region ݎ, 
 ௝ܻ௥ is value-added by sector ݆ in region ݎ, 
 ߪ௝௒ is the elasticity of substitution between the primary factors, 
 ߙ௔௝௥௒  is the share parameter that reflects requirements of the primary factor ܽ in 
production, and 
 ߠ௝௥௒  is the scaling factor. 
The FOC for optimization is 
 ݓ௔௥ ൌ ߙ௔௝௥௒ ݌௝௥௒ ൫ߠ௝௥௒ ൯ቀఙೕ
ೊିଵቁ ఙೕೊൗ ൬ ௒ೕೝ௏ೌೕೝ൰
ଵ ఙೕೊ⁄
   ٣ ௔ܸ௝௥. (4) 
 
Gross Output: Finally, the unified production segment of firms in sector ݆ in region ݎ 
determine input levels of composite input factors ௝ܻ௥ (value-added) and ෨ܺ௝௥ (composite 
intermediate commodity) to minimize cost subject to a CES technology. The problem can 
be expressed as 
 min ݌௝௥௒ ௝ܻ௥ ൅ ݌௝௥௑ ෨ܺ௝௥ 
 s.t. ௝ܼ௥ ൌ ߠ௝௥௓ ቊߙ௝௥௓ ௝ܻ௥
ቀఙೕೋିଵቁ ఙೕೋൗ ൅ ൫1 െ ߙ௝௥௓ ൯ ෨ܺ௝௥
ቀఙೕೋିଵቁ ఙೕೋൗ ቋ
ఙೕೋ ቀఙೕೋିଵቁൗ
 
        ٣ ݌௝௥௓ , (5) 
where 
 ݌௝௥௓  is the price index for gross output by sector ݆ in region ݎ, 
 ௝ܼ௥ is gross output by sector ݆ in region ݎ, 
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 ߪ௝௓ is the elasticity of substitution between composite input factors, 
 ߙ௝௥௓  is the share parameter that reflects requirements of value-added ௝ܻ௥  to 
produce ௝ܼ௥, and 
 ߠ௝௥௓  is the scaling factor. 
The FOC for optimization is 
 ݌௥௒ ൌ ଵଵାఛೕೝೋ ߙ௝௥
௓ ݌௝௥௓ ൫ߠ௝௥௓ ൯ቀఙೕ
ೋିଵቁ ఙೕೋൗ ൬௓ೕೝ௒ೕೝ൰
ଵ ఙೕೋ⁄
   ٣ ௝ܻ௥, (6) 
and 
 ݌௝௥௑ ൌ ଵଵାఛೕೝೋ ൫1 െ ߙ௝௥
௓ ൯݌௝௥௓ ൫ߠ௝௥௓ ൯ቀఙೕ
ೋିଵቁ ఙೕೋൗ ൬௓ೕೝ௑෨ೕೝ൰
ଵ ఙೕೋ⁄
  ٣ ෨ܺ௝௥, (7) 
where ௝߬௥௓  is the rate of indirect taxes on production. 
 
2.2 Inter-regional Trade: The Melitz-type Trade Module 
 
The inter-regional links between gross outputs in source regions and absorptions in 
destinations are represented by the Melitz-type trade module based on Balistreri and 
Rutherford (2012), and Dixon, Jerie, and Rimmer (2015). The equations that form our 
Melitz-type trade module are summarized as follows:2 
 ∑ ௜ܺ௝௦௝ ൅ ܥ௜௦ ൌ ߠ௜௦் ቐ
ሺ1 െ ∑ ߙ௜௥௦்௥ ሻ ௜ܰ௦൫ఉ೔ೞାఙ೔೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ ܦ௜௦൫ఙ೔
೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ
൅∑ ߙ௜௥௦் ሺܧ௜௥௦ ௜ܰ௥ሻ൫ఉ೔ೞାఙ೔೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ௥ ܳ௜௥௦൫ఙ೔
೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ
ቑ
ఙ೔೅ ൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯ൗ
 
        ٣ ݌௜௦; (8) 
 ݌௜௦஽ ൌ ሺ1 െ ∑ ߙ௜௥௦்௥ ሻሺߠ௜௦்ሻ൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ ௜ܰ௦ሺఉ೔ೞିଵሻ ఙ೔೅⁄ ݌௜௦ ቀ∑ ௑೔ೕೞೕ ା஼೔ೞ஽೔ೞ ቁ
ଵ ఙ೔೅⁄
 
        ٣ ܦ௜௦; (9) 
 ሺ1 ൅ ߬௜௥௦ெ ሻሺ1 ൅ ߬௜௥௦் ሻሺ1 ൅ ߬௜௥௦ா ሻ݌௜௥௦ொ  
 ൌ ߙ௜௥௦் ሺߠ௜௦்ሻ൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ ሺܧ௜௥௦ ௜ܰ௥ሻሺఉ೔ೞିଵሻ ఙ೔೅⁄ ݌௜௦ ቀ∑ ௑೔ೕೞೕ ା஼೔ೞொ೔ೝೞ ቁ
ଵ ఙ೔೅⁄
 ٣ ܳ௜௥௦; (10) 
 ݌௜௥஽ ൌ ቀ ଵଵାఎ೔ቁ ݌௜௥
௪      ٣ ݌௜௥஽ ; (11) 
 ݌௜௥௦ொ ൌ ቀ ଵଵାఎ೔ቁ
௣೔ೝೢ
ఝ೔ೝೞ     ٣ ݌௜௥௦
ொ ; (12) 
 ௜ܰ௥ܦ௜௥ ൅ ∑ ܧ௜௥௦௦ ௜ܰ௥ ொ೔ೝೞఝ೔ೝೞ ൅ ߗ௥ ൌ ܼ௜௥ െ ௜ܰ௥ܪ௜௥ െ ∑ ܧ௜௥௦௦ ௜ܰ௥ܨ௜௥௦ 
                                                     
2 The deriving process of these seven equations is explained in Oyamada (2014). 
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        ٣ ݌௜௥ௐ; (13) 
 ܧ௜௥௦ ൌ ൬ ఊ೔ఊ೔ିఙ೔೅ାଵ൰
ఊ೔ ൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯⁄ ߮௜௥௦ିఊ೔     ٣ ܧ௜௥௦; (14) 
 ߮௜௥௦ ൌ ఊ೔ିఙ೔
೅ାଵ
ఊ೔൫ఙ೔೅ିଵ൯
ቀொ೔ೝೞி೔ೝೞቁ     ٣ ߮௜௥௦; (15) 
and 
 ݌௜௥௪ሺܪ௜௥ ൅ ∑ ܧ௜௥௦௦ ܨ௜௥௦ሻ ൌ െߟ௜൫݌௜௥஽ܦ௜௥ ൅ ∑ ܧ௜௥௦݌௜௥௦ொ ܳ௜௥௦௦ ൯ ٣ ௜ܰ௥, (16) 
where 
 ܥ௜௦ is the final demand for commodity ݅ in region ݏ, 
 ܦ௜௦ is the domestic (intra-national) trade flow of commodity ݅ sold in region ݏ, 
 ܳ௜௥௦ is the inter- and intra-regional (not intra-national but inter-national) trade 
flow of commodity ݅ sold by exporting firms in region ݎ to region ݏ, 
 ݌௜௦஽  is the differentiated sales price for domestic market ݏ, 
 ݌௜௥௦ொ  is the differentiated sales price for inter-regional market ݏ sold by firms in 
region ݎ excluding the transportation margin and the import tariff, 
 ݌௜௥௪ is the wholesale price of the products, 
 ܧ௜௥௦ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ is the proportion of exporting firms in region ݎ that sell products 
to region ݏ, 
 ߮௜௥௦ is the average productivity of exporting firms, 
 ௜ܰ௥ is the number of firms entered in region ݎ, 
 ܨ௜௥௦ is the fixed exporting cost as measured in units of gross output (composite 
input) and necessary to make sales on the ݎ-ݏ link, 
 ܪ௜௥ is the fixed entry cost as measured in units of gross output (composite input) 
and necessary to establish a firm in region ݎ, 
 ߚ௜௦ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ is the strength of importer’s PfV, 
 ߪ௜் ൐ 1  is the elasticity of substitution between the varieties from various 
sources, 
 ߙ௜௥௦்  is the weight parameter that reflects the preference of region ݏ for the 
region of origin ݎ, 
 ߠ௜௦் is the scaling factor, 
 ߟ௜ is related to the elasticity of substitution ߪ் such that ߟ௜ ≡ െ1 ߪ௜்⁄ , 
 ߛ௜ is a shape parameter related to productivity such that ߛ௜ ൐ ߪ௜் െ 1,3 
 ߬௜௥௦ா  is the rate of export duty/subsidy, 
                                                     
3 For details, see Balistreri and Rutherford (2012). 
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 ߬௜௥௦்  is the rate of transportation margin, 
 ߬௜௥௦ெ  is the import tariff rate, and 
 ߗ௥ is inter-regional transportation supply defined with a regional share parameter 
߱௥ as 
 ߗ௥ ≡ ఠೝ௣"೔బమ"ೝೈ ∑ ∑ ∑ ߬௜ᇲ௥ᇲ௦
்௦ ൫1 ൅ ߬௜ᇲ௥ᇲ௦ா ൯ܧ௜ᇲ௥ᇲ௦ܰ௜ᇲ௥ᇲ݌௜ᇲ௥ᇲ௦ொ ܳ௜ᇲ௥ᇲ௦௥ᇲ௜ᇲ . 
ߗ௥ is included in Equation (13) if and only if ݅ is the services sector (i02). Furthermore, 
the second and the third terms in the right-hand side of Equation (13) enter if and only if ݅ 
is the manufacturing sectors (i03, i04, and i05). Similarly, ߟ௜ and ߮௜௥௦ enter Equations 
(11) and (12) only when ݅ is the manufacturing sectors. Equations (14) through (16) are 
only for the manufacturing sectors. 
 
2.3 Final Demand 
 
Composite Commodity for Final Consumption: Similar to the case of intermediate 
inputs, the representative consumer in region ݏ determines demand levels of commodity ݅ 
for final demand ܥ௜௥  to minimize cost subject to a Cobb-Douglas aggregator.4 The 
problem can be expressed as 
 min ∑ ݌௜௥௜ ܥ௜௥ 
 s.t. ܥሚ௥ ൌ ߠ௥஼ ∏ ܥ௜௥ఈ೔ೝ
಴
௜      ٣ ݌௥஼, (17) 
where 
 ݌௥஼ is price index for the composite commodity for final demand in region ݎ; 
 ܥሚ௥ is quantity of composite commodity for final demand in region ݎ; 
 ߙ௜௥஼  is the share parameter that reflects requirements of commodity ݅ to form 
ܥሚ௥; and 
 ߠ௥஼ is the scaling factor. 
The FOC for optimization is 
 ݌௜௥ ൌ ߙ௜௥஼ ݌௥஼ ቀ஼ሚೝ஼೔ೝቁ     ٣ ܥ௜௥. (18) 
 
Welfare: Then, the representative consumer in region ݏ maximizes the level of composite 
final demand ܥሚ௥, which represents his/her welfare level, subject to a budget constraint, 
                                                     
4 Final demand ܥ௜௥ includes fixed capital formation to keep the model simple in this study. 
 9 
 
given as the total of factor income and tax revenue transferred from the regional authority. 
In this setting, we presume that the current account remains imbalanced at the same 
position given by the benchmark data for simplicity.5 This problem can be expressed as 
follows: 
 max ܥሚ௥ 
 s.t. ݌௥஼ܥሚ௥ ൌ ∑ ∑ ݓ௔௥௝௔ ௔ܸ௝௥ ൅ ௥ܶ ൅ ܵ௥̅ி   ٣ ߣ௥, (19) 
where 
 ߣ௥ is the total change of composite consumption given a unit increase of income; 
 ܵ௥̅ி is foreign savings by region ݎ, which is given exogenously; and 
 ௥ܶ is the tax revenue, defined as 
 ௥ܶ ≡ ∑
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ఛೕೝೋଵାఛೕೝೋ ݌௝௥
ௐ ௝ܼ௥
൅∑ ߬௜௥௦ா௦ ܧ௜௥௦ ௜ܰ௥݌௜௥௦ொ ܳ௜௥௦
൅∑ ߬௜௦௥ெ௦ ሺ1 ൅ ߬௜௦௥் ሻሺ1 ൅ ߬௜௦௥ா ሻܧ௜௦௥ ௜ܰ௦݌௜௦௥ொ ܳ௜௦௥ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
௝ . 
Note that ܧ௜௥௦ ௜ܰ௥ is set to unity when ݅ is not the manufacturing sector, since the primary 
industries and services sectors are assumed to be perfectly competitive so that the 
Armington-type specification is applied. The FOC for optimization is 
 ߣ௥݌௥஼ ൌ 1      ٣ ܥሚ௥. (20) 
 
2.4 Other Items 
 
Factor Market: The factor market clearing conditions are 
 ∑ ௔ܸ௝௥௝ ൌ തܸ௔௥      ٣ ݓ௔௥, (21) 
where തܸ௔௥ is the exogenously given factor endowment. 
 
A Dual Relation: Finally, a relation between ݌௝௥௓  (price index for gross output) and ݌௝௥ௐ 
(wholesale price) is added: 
 ݌௝௥௓ ൌ ݌௝௥ௐ      ٣ ௝ܼ௥. (22) 
 
     The system of a six-region, five-sector AGE model that includes the Melitz-type 
trade module is described by 22 equations consist of (1) through (22). Because of the 
Walras' Law, one of the market clearing conditions automatically holds. In this regard, for 
                                                     
5 The level of position (foreign savings) is valued by the price of numéraire commodity. Foreign savings 
ܵ௥̅ி is defined by the total value of imports at CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) prices minus the total value of 
exports at FOB (free-on-board) prices that includes inter-regional transportation supply. In the present model, 
net factor income from abroad does not exist. 
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example, we drop Equation (13) with respect to the primary industries (i01) in the EU (r01), 
exogenously setting the corresponding ݌௜௥ௐ to unity. This implies we treat the primary 
products made in the EU as the numéraire commodity. 
 
2.5 Data and Parameterization 
 
In the implementation process of an AGE model, we need to match the theoretical features 
of the model with benchmark data. There are two possible approaches as Hertel (2009) has 
shown. One approach is to assume the existence of unobserved (iceberg) trade costs to fill 
the gap between the observed and calculated trade flows given as a solution by an AGE 
model with a symmetric preference for varieties among exporters in the replication test. 
This approach requires re-estimation of the transportation margins based on a certain 
assumption. The second approach is to include preference weights to capture differentiation 
among regions, such as home bias, as in the Armington-type specifications. 
     Zhai (2008) and Balistreri, Hillberry, and Rutherford (2011) have taken the former 
approach. Zhai (2008) derived the unobserved transportation margins on the international 
trade flows by assuming that domestic trade incurs no iceberg trade costs.6 Balistreri, 
Hillberry, and Rutherford (2011) econometrically estimated the whole set of parameters by 
using a nonlinear structural estimation procedure. On the other hand, Balistreri and 
Rutherford (2012) and Dixon, Jerie, and Rimmer (2015) have referred to the possibilities of 
the latter approach. Balistreri and Rutherford (2012) have explained a part of the calibration 
procedures in both approaches. To pursue a more labor-saving and simpler way by making 
full use of the information that we are familiar with or have relatively easy access to, we 
take the latter approach by assuming the non-existence of unobserved trade costs. 
     The most important point is that changes in varieties are fully assessed in the 
importer’s demand aggregator in many studies. Ardelean (2006) explored how strong the 
PfV is, and found that importer’s PfV is around 40 percent lower than the one assumed in 
the Krugman’s model. Therefore, we compare simulation results obtained with both strong 
and relatively weak PfV in the following section. As we saw previously, we introduced an 
additional parameter (ߚ௜௦) that assessed the influence of PfV. At ߚ௜௦ ൌ 0, Equation (8) is 
equivalent to the Armington-type and an importer ݏ places no value on additional varieties. 
At ߚ௦ ൌ 1, the setting is consistent with the assumption in the theoretical models by 
                                                     
6 Careful consideration is required to apply this assumption when one is going to handle regions instead of 
countries. Assuming that intra-regional trade does not incur iceberg costs, no matter the distances between the 
countries grouped in the same region, might be unrealistic in some cases. 
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Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003), with which an importer ݏ  fully enjoys variety 
increase. An important point here is that the CES weights ߙ௜௥௦் ሺܧ௜௥௦ ௜ܰ௥ሻ൫ఉ೔ೞାఙ೔೅ିଵ൯ ఙ೔೅ൗ  are 
now endogenous when ߚ௜௦ ൐ 0. One of the problems of the Armington-type specification 
pointed out in previous studies is that the CES weights are fixed and do not change in the 
long-run. Contrary, the present model can manage the case an importer endogenously 
changes his/her valuation of the commodity based on certain changes in the economic 
environment. 
     The model is calibrated to the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 8.1 database7 
for 2007 along with additional information on the shape parameter related to productivity 
(ߛ௜). The original 129 countries/regions and 57 commodities/activities are respectively 
aggregated to six and five. The regions consist of the EU (r01); the USA (r02); Japan (r03); 
China (r04); ASEAN (r05); and ROW (r06).8 The five sectors are the primary industries 
(i01), services (i02), motor vehicles and parts (i03); electronic equipment (i04); and other 
manufacturing (i05). As noted previously, the manufacturing sectors (i03 through i05) are 
assumed to be imperfectly competitive with IRTS, while the other two are characterized by 
CRTS. The primary industries sector (i01) uses a sector specific factor, such as land and 
natural resources, in addition to capital, labor, and intermediate goods in its production 
process. The services sector (i03) provides a fraction of its output as the inter-regional 
transportation supply. 
     Estimates for ߛ௜ can be found in several empirical studies, such as Melitz and 
Redding (2013), Balistreri, Hillberry, and Rutherford (2011), and Bernard, Redding, and 
Schott (2007). Based on their findings, we set ߛ௜ to 5.0. All of the other parameters except 
PfV (ߚ௜௦) can be calibrated since the choices of initial values of the number of entered firms 
( ௜ܰ௥) and the proportion of exporting firms (ܧ௜௥௦) or levels of fixed costs (ܪ௜௥ and ܨ௜௥௦) 
will not affect simulation results as long as we evaluate effects in terms of deviations 
(percentage changes) from the initial levels of endogenous variables.9 Therefore, fixed 
costs can be derived setting ௜ܰ௥ to be unity, and ܧ௜௥௦ to be any preferred levels between 
zero and unity. The calibration step is similar to the ones adopted in traditional AGE 
models. 
 
                                                     
7 For details, see Hertel (1997). 
8 The EU consists of the following 28 countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Croatia, and 
Romania. The ASEAN includes: Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, and the Rest of Southeast Asia. 
9 For detailed explanations, see Oyamada (2014). 
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3. Experiments 
 
In this section, we report on the results of simulation experiments performed using the 
six-region, five-sector AGE model with the Melitz-type trade module introduced in the 
previous section. Taking the case of the EU ELV/RoHS directives as an example, we will 
show the usefulness and limitations to include the Melitz-type trade specification in 
assessments of economic effects of NTBs. 
 
3.1 Scenario and Policy Modeling 
 
The simulation experiments are categorized into two types. In the first type, we examine the 
effects of changing the fixed exporting cost (ܨ௜௥௦) necessary to make sales on the ݎ-ݏ link 
in two cases when importer’s PfV is strong (ߚ௜௦ ൌ 1) and relatively weak as Ardelean 
(2006) suggests (ߚ௜௦ ൌ 0.5). In the second type, we examine how the results obtained in the 
first type change when the importer’s PfV (ߚ௜௦) take different values from zero to unity. 
While we focus on the effects of changing ܨ௜௥௦ on economic variables in the former type, 
the effects of changing ߚ௜௦ is focused in the latter. 
     The EU ELV and RoHS directives are basically expressed as the permanent increase 
of the fixed exporting cost (ܨ௜௥௦) necessary to make sales on the EU market (ݏ ൌ r01) 
corresponding to motor vehicles and parts (݅ ൌ i03) and electronic equipment (݅ ൌ i04), 
respectively. Since we may not measure the volumes of the cost increases by introducing 
ELV/RoHS, ܨ௜௥௦ corresponding to ݅ ൌ i03 or ݅ ൌ i04, as well as ݏ ൌ r01, is simply 
expanded by 50%, 100%, and 200%. In addition, it is uncertain how much the introduction 
of ELV/RoHS increases the cost for the trade within the EU compared to the one for the 
imports from outside the EU. Therefore, we consider three cases: (1) when the fixed 
exporting cost (ܨ௜௥௦) for the intra-EU trade (ݎ ൌ ݏ ൌ r01) is kept unchanged from its initial 
level; (2) when the cost is increased to the extent as the ones for the imports from outside; 
and (3) when the fixed entry cost (ܪ௜௥) in the EU, instead of the fixed exporting cost (ܨ௜௥௦) 
for the intra-EU trade, is increased by 5%, 10%, and 20%. The reason why the changing 
volumes are ten times smaller than the case of the fixed exporting cost (ܨ௜௥௦) is because the 
impact by changing ܪ௜௥ is much stronger than the one by ܨ௜௥௦. 
     When we change the value of importer’s PfV (ߚ௜௦) from zero to unity, the model is 
re-calibrated for every values of ߚ௜௦ to purify the effects of ELV/RoHS and make it 
comparable to each other. If we change the value of ߚ௜௦ after the model is calibrated, the 
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modification itself alters the economic environment and affects the state of the global 
economy (an equilibrium), even when no policy change takes place. The effects of 
changing the value of ߚ௜௦ should be clearly distinguished and split from those of policy 
changes, and swept out from the experiments. 
 
3.2 Effects of EU RoHS/ELV Directives when PfV Is Strong 
 
Let us start with examining the effects of ELV/RoHS on selected economic variables in the 
case when importer’s PfV is strong (ߚ௜௦ ൌ 1). Table 1 shows the effects of 200% increase 
of the fixed exporting cost (ܨ௜௥௦) necessary to make sales on the EU market (ݏ ൌ r01) 
respectively on the value of exports to the EU, on the price of exports to the EU, on the 
value of domestic flows within the EU, on the price of domestic flows within the EU, on 
the proportion of the firms exporting to the EU, on the average productivity of the firms 
exporting to the EU, and on the total variety exported to the EU related to the focused 
sector, i.e., motor vehicles and parts (i03) in the case of ELV and electronic equipment (i04) 
in the case of RoHS. The effects are measured as deviations (percentage changes) from the 
base case given by the benchmark data set built on the GTAP 8.1 database. The sings +++, 
++, +, -, --, and --- implies the volume of effect is greater than 20%, 10% to 20%, 0% to 
10%, -10% to 0%, -20% to -10%, and less than -20%, respectively. The signs out of 
parentheses are the average of the non-EU regions/countries, while the ones in the 
parentheses correspond to the EU. In Scenario “ELV”, ܨ௜௥௦ corresponding to Sector i03 
increases. Similarly, in Scenario “RoHS”, ܨ௜௥௦  corresponding to Sector i04 increases. 
Since Scenario ELV/RoHS, which implies simultaneous implementation of ELV and RoHS, 
includes both Sectors i03 and i04, the signs are shown in the manner i03/i04. Finally, Cases 
“U”, “I”, and “D” imply the cases when the fixed exporting cost (ܨ௜௥௦) for the intra-EU 
trade is kept unchanged from its initial level, when the cost is increased to the extent as the 
ones for the imports from outside, and when the fixed entry cost (ܪ௜௥) in the EU, instead of 
the fixed exporting cost (ܨ௜௥௦) for the intra-EU trade, is increased by 5%, 10%, and 20%, 
respectively. Because the signs do not change in the cases when the fixed exporting cost is 
increased by 50% and 100%, only the case for 200% (20% for ܪ௜௥) increase is shown in 
Table 1. 
     At the outset, we focus on the cases when the fixed exporting cost (ܨ௜௥௦) for the 
intra-EU trade is kept unchanged or increased (Cases U and I). If we look at the non-EU 
countries, which are shown outside the parentheses, it is clear that the exports to the EU 
decrease regardless of the cases ELV and RoHS. Another important point is that smaller 
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proportions of highly productive firms operate. If we look at the EU members, which are 
shown inside the parentheses, we will find the following three points. First, domestic 
productions expand to cover the decreased imports from outside the EU. Second, smaller 
proportion of highly productive firms operates, similar to the non-EU firms. Third, if we 
focus on the case when fixed exporting cost is kept unchanged, which is shown with “U”, 
the intra-EU trade also expands. In the background, entry of firms in the EU increases so 
that the total variety also increases. As a result, welfare level of the EU members improves 
when ܨ௜௥௦ for the intra-EU trade is kept unchanged. Contrary, welfare level of the EU 
members worsens in the case when ܨ௜௥௦ for the intra-EU trade is increased, which is 
shown with “I”, since the number of entered firms in the EU decreases. These effects can 
be referred to as the protection effects. 
     Next, let us turn to focus on the case when the fixed entry cost (ܪ௜௥) in the EU is 
increased by 20% instead of ܨ௜௥௦ (Case D). If we look at the non-EU countries, exports to 
the EU tend to increase because of the reduced entry of firms in the EU. In this case, 
smaller number of highly productive firms operates, and the firm-level exports expand. It 
implies that large-scale firms dominate. If we look at the EU members, we will find 
domestic productions shrink because of the less entry. On the other hand, proportion of 
exporting firms increases because of the fixed exporting costs are kept unchanged. Then, 
large-scale firms lead expansion of the intra-EU trade in the case of RoHS. 
    One interesting point observed throughout Cases U, I, and D, is that the proportion of 
the firms exporting to the EU totally synchronizes with the price of exports to the EU. In 
addition, the average productivity of the firms exporting to the EU shows just the opposite 
signs of those items. Because of the expanded fixed exporting cost, only the firms who 
have relatively high productivity, and are able to cover the cost, may survive. Higher 
productivity enables firms to produce with cheaper prices. It is the source of high 
competitiveness. 
     As mentioned above, the effects of ELV/RoHS on the welfare level of the EU 
members reflect the changes in total variety. Table 2 shows the changes in regional welfare 
levels for the entire scenario when importer’s PfV is strong (ߚ௜௦ ൌ 1). Those who are better 
off are the regions/countries successful in expanding domestic trade, intra-regional trade, or 
inter-regional trade with a non-EU region/country replacing the shrunk exports to the EU. 
An interesting point is that the USA (r02) is worse off in all of the ELV/RoHS combinations 
when the fixed exporting cost for the intra-EU trade is increased (Case I), while Japan (r03) 
is always worse off when the cost is kept unchanged (Case U). A possible story for the USA 
is that the productions of commodities exported to the EU use relatively large amount of the 
 15 
 
US made intermediates. For Japan, the commodities traded within the EU might be rivalries 
of the Japanese products. 
     When the USA (r02) is worse off, China (r04) and ASEAN (r05) tend to suffer 
negative impact. It suggests that the two Asian regions/countries supply sub-components 
for the US products. Since this tendency is relatively weak for China, we infer ASEAN has 
stronger/weaker relationships with USA/Japan compared to China. 
     Another interesting point is that all of the non-EU regions/countries are worse off in 
Scenario RoHS when the fixed exporting cost for the intra-EU trade is kept unchanged 
(Case U). In this case, the number of entered firms substantially increases in the EU 
because of the unchanged fixed exporting and entry costs so that both the intra-EU trade 
and the domestic sales in the EU substitute the imports from outside. 
     Finally, note that ELV and RoHS have effects in the same direction. The case of 
simultaneous implementation of ELV/RoHS shows the results mixed of the cases ELV and 
RoHS are independently implemented. 
 
3.3 Effects of EU RoHS/ELV Directives when PfV Is Not Strong 
 
Let us move to the effects of ELV/RoHS in the case when importer’s PfV is not so strong 
(ߚ௜௦ ൌ 0.5). Table 3 shows the effects of 200% increase of the fixed exporting cost (ܨ௜௥௦) 
necessary to make sales on the EU market (ݏ ൌ r01) on the selected variables we saw 
previously. In Case D, the fixed entry cost (ܪ௜௥) in the EU is increased by 20% instead of 
ܨ௜௥௦ for the intra-EU trade. 
     From Table 3, we may find two points. First, if we look at the non-EU countries, 
exports to the EU expand in all cases. Second, if we look at the EU members, results related 
to the trade-flows are reversed from the previous case when we assume strong PfV in Cases 
U and I. These results are brought by the importer’s PfV. If the PfV is not strong, there 
might be a room to increase volumes of productions/dealings per firm to keep welfare to a 
certain level even if the number of exporting firms reduces. It is clear if we look at Case I, 
in which welfare level of the EU members improves in spite of the fact that total variety 
decreases. In this kind of situation, large-scale firms that have high productivity can play 
important roles. When the number of firms reduces, the sector-wide consumption of 
resources to pay fixed costs can be saved so that a firm may expand its production and 
suppress its output price fully enjoying the fruit of economies of scale. Therefore, 
consumers may be better off by the relatively cheap mass-products. By the relatively cheap 
commodities imported from outside the EU, the domestic trade within the EU is crowded 
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out and the price of domestic products depreciates. 
     In accordance with the previous story, the proportion of the firms exporting to the EU 
as well as the total variety tends to reduce. On the other hand, welfare levels of the EU in 
Cases U and I tend to be better in spite of the fact that the total variety reduces. Because of 
the balanced preference for both variety and the volume of consumption, the welfare level 
can be kept by the expanded imports produced by large-scale firms. In Case D, increase in 
fixed entry cost drastically spoils the competitiveness of firms in the EU members. It is 
reflected to the prices of domestic and imported EU-made products in the EU countries. 
Then, reduced entry of firms in the EU brings lower welfare level to the EU members. 
     Table 4 shows the changes in regional welfare levels for the entire scenario when 
importer’s PfV is relatively weak (ߚ௜௦ ൌ 0.5). Although the changes are not so large, 
increases in the fixed exporting cost brought by the ELV/RoHS directives tend to improve 
welfare levels of all regions/countries except for the EU members when ELV is 
implemented in Case U, and in the all combinations of ELV/RoHS when Case D applies. In 
these cases, the firms in the EU exporting to other EU members may not enjoy the fruit of 
economies of scale saving the payment for the fixed costs. 
 
3.4 Effects of Changing Strength of the Importer’s PfV 
 
As we have seen, the effects of the permanent increase of the fixed exporting cost necessary 
to make sales on the EU market corresponding to motor vehicles and parts (i03) and 
electronic equipment (i04) totally change under different assumptions on the importer’s 
PfV (ߚ௜௦). The almost totally opposite results may look embarrassing for many people those 
who are concerned with policy-makings. Hence, it is worth examining the effects of 
changing ߚ௜௦. 
     Figure 1 captures the Hicksian equivalent variations in billions US dollars when the 
value of ߚ௜௦ is changed from zero to unity for the case in which the fixed exporting cost 
necessary to make sales on the EU market corresponding to Sectors i03 and i04 is raised 
50%. This scenario represents the simultaneous implementation of the ELV and RoHS 
when the fixed exporting cost for the intra-EU trade is increased along within the imports 
from outside the EU (Case I). It is clear that the welfare level of the EU monotonically 
decreases from 57.453 to -43.391 billion US dollars. Compared to the EU, the welfare 
changes in other regions/countries are negligible. The most important point is that the 
welfare effects for the EU turns from positive to negative around ߚ௜௦ ൌ 0.7. This suggests 
that empirical estimations of ߚ௜௦  play important roles in assessments of ELV/RoHS 
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directives if one is planning to evaluate those policies utilizing a model with the Melitz-type 
trade specification. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Modeling NTBs has long been a challenge for builders of AGE models, since NTBs are not 
straightforwardly connectable to economic variables included in a model unlike taxes or 
tariffs, in addition to the fact that information on NTBs is not easy to collect, sort out 
complication, or quantitatively measure. This paper explored the potential usefulness of an 
AGE model with the Melitz-type trade specification to assess economic effects of technical 
regulations, taking the case of the EU ELV/RoHS directives as an example. With the 
special focus on the strength of the importer’s PfV, the key findings can be summarized as 
follows. 
 
1. When the importer’s PfV is strong as assumed in the theoretical model by Melitz 
(2003), raising the fixed exporting cost to make sales in the EU market brings 
reductions in exports of the targeted commodities (motor vehicles and parts for ELV 
and electronic equipment for RoHS) to the EU from outside regions/countries while 
the domestic and intra-regional trade in the EU expands to cover the decreased 
imports, in the cases when the fixed exporting cost for the intra-EU trade is kept 
unchanged or increased. 
 
2. If the fixed entry cost in the EU increases instead of the fixed exporting cost for the 
intra-EU trade when the importer’s PfV is strong, exports of the targeted 
commodities (motor vehicles and parts for ELV and electronic equipment for 
RoHS) to the EU from outside regions/countries expand because of the reduced 
entry of firms in the EU, even though the fixed exporting cost to make sales in the 
EU market is raised. 
 
3. Those who are better off when the importer’s PfV is strong are the regions/countries 
successful in expanding domestic trade, intra-regional trade, or inter-regional trade 
with a non-EU region/country replacing the shrunk exports to the EU. 
 
4. When the importer’s PfV is not strong as Ardelean (2006) suggests, raising the 
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fixed exporting cost to make sales in the EU market brings interesting results that 
exports of the targeted commodities (motor vehicles and parts for ELV and 
electronic equipment for RoHS) to the EU from outside regions expand while the 
domestic trade in the member countries of the EU shrinks. 
 
5. If the PfV is not strong, policy changes that may bring reduction in the number of 
firms enable survived producers with high productivity to expand production to be 
large-scale mass producers fully enjoying the fruit of economies of scale. As a result, 
consumers may be better off by the relatively cheap mass products. 
 
6. When the strength of the importer’s PfV (ߚ௜௦) is changed from zero to unity, the 
welfare effects for the EU turns from positive to negative around ߚ௜௦ ൌ 0.7. This 
value is the dividing ridge over which simulations results and their interpretations 
totally differ. 
 
     If we regard the productivity growth to cover the fixed exporting cost as a kind of 
cost-effective innovation, applying a model with the Melitz-type trade specification to 
analyses on the EU ELV/RoHS directives may provide insights on the questions related to 
the potential innovation induced by environmental policies with economic instruments 
studied by Mazzanti and Zoboli (2006) and Crotty and Smith (2006). Our results (the cells 
corresponding to “Productivity of Firms Exporting to EU” and “Case D” in Tables 1 and 3) 
suggest that the ELV/RoHS directives may discourage innovation in the EU members while 
the innovation outside the EU would be promoted, if the fixed entry cost in the EU 
increases instead of the fixed exporting cost for the intra-EU trade. 
     Furthermore, the model can be applied to assess greening of supply chain or 
evaluations of environmental product standards, such as those studied by Koh, 
Gunasekaran, and Tseng (2012), Tong, Shi, and Zhou (2912), and Ishikawa and Okubo 
(2011), if one introduces an environment-related index into the model. 
     On the other hand, simulation results and their interpretations may totally differ 
depending on the assumed level of the importer’s PfV (ߚ௜௦). When the importer’s PfV is 
strong, firms tend to respond to demand expansion by increasing the number of firms and 
to reduction by shrinking their production/dealings per firm, while they respond to demand 
expansion by increasing their production/dealings per firm and to reduction by decreasing 
the number of firms when the PfV is weak. Since this study presents the very first step to 
approach to model NTBs, many efforts are needed to make it of practical use. Our findings 
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suggest that empirical estimations of the strength of the importer’s PfV play important roles 
in assessments of ELV/RoHS directives if one is planning to evaluate those policies 
utilizing a model with the Melitz-type trade specification. 
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Table 1. Effects of ELV/RoHS on Selected Economic Variables when Importer’s PfV Is Strong (ࢼ࢏࢙ ൌ ૚) 
 
Note 1: +++ (0.20 ~), ++ (0.10 ~ 0.20), + (0.00 ~ 0.10), - (-0.10 ~ 0.00), -- (-0.20 ~ -0.10), and --- (~ -0.20). 
Note 2: “Welfare Level of EU” is in percentage. 
Note 3: Non-EU (EU) and i03/i04. 
Note 4: The signs for non-EU are the averages of non-EU regions.
Scenario Type Exports to EU Price of Exports to EU EU Domestic Price of EU Domestic
HU －－－ (＋＋) －－－ (－) (＋＋) (－)
HI － (－－) －－－ (－－－) (＋＋) (＋)
HD ＋ (－) －－ (＋) (－) (＋)
HU －－－ (＋＋＋) －－－ (－) (＋＋＋) (－)
HI －－ (－－) －－－ (－－－) (＋＋＋) (＋)
HD ＋ (＋) －－ (＋) (－) (＋)
HU －－－/－－－ (＋＋/＋＋＋) －－－/－－－ (－/－) (＋＋/＋＋＋) (－/－)
HI －/－－ (－－/－－) －－－/－－－ (－－－/－－－) (＋＋/＋＋＋) (＋/＋)
HD ＋/－ (－/－) －－/－－ (＋/＋) (－/－) (＋/＋)
Scenario Type Proportion of Firms Exporting to EU Productivity of Firms Exporting to EU Total Variety Welfare Level of EU (%)
HU －－－ (－) ＋＋＋ (＋) －－－ (＋＋) (＋＋)
HI －－－ (－－－) ＋＋＋ (＋＋＋) －－－ (－－－) (－－－)
HD －－－ (＋＋＋) ＋＋＋ (－) －－－ (－) (－－－)
HU －－－ (－) ＋＋＋ (＋) －－－ (＋＋＋) (＋)
HI －－－ (－－－) ＋＋＋ (＋＋＋) －－－ (－－－) (－－－)
HD －－－ (＋＋＋) ＋＋＋ (－) －－－ (－) (－－－)
HU －－－/－－－ (－/－) ＋＋＋/＋＋＋ (＋/＋) －－－/－－－ (＋＋/＋＋＋) (＋＋＋)
HI －－－/－－－ (－－－/－－－) ＋＋＋/＋＋＋ (＋＋＋/＋＋＋) －－－/－－－ (－－－/－－－) (－－－)
HD －－－/－－－ (＋＋＋/＋＋＋) ＋＋＋/＋＋＋ (－/－) －－－/－－－ (－/－) (－－－)
ELV/RoHS 200%
ELV 200%
RoHS 200%
ELV/RoHS 200%
ELV 200%
RoHS 200%
 22 
 
Table 2. Welfare Effects of ELV/RoHS (ࢼ࢏࢙ ൌ ૚) 
HU
r01 r02 r03 r04 r05 r06
ELV 50% 0.071522 0.108144 -0.004602 0.028104 0.042944 -0.173671
ELV 100% 0.115180 0.172119 -0.008046 0.046045 0.076134 -0.276160
ELV 200% 0.173919 0.257083 -0.014024 0.073024 0.133986 -0.411098
RoHS 50% 0.011051 -0.078959 -0.010049 -0.024726 -0.010639 -0.034228
RoHS 100% 0.015932 -0.125320 -0.015706 -0.039153 -0.014069 -0.050385
RoHS 200% 0.020264 -0.180301 -0.022171 -0.057115 -0.016055 -0.065831
ELV/RoHS 50% 0.085157 0.032661 -0.014965 0.009106 0.033075 -0.214358
ELV/RoHS 100% 0.139122 0.058741 -0.024945 0.023253 0.068599 -0.347002
ELV/RoHS 200% 0.232650 0.140231 -0.043348 0.071699 0.186105 -0.574910
HI
r01 r02 r03 r04 r05 r06
ELV 50% -0.166013 -0.017743 0.003021 0.000157 -0.003065 0.023312
ELV 100% -0.270631 -0.021979 0.004698 0.002109 -0.002321 0.027023
ELV 200% -0.402091 -0.019505 0.006663 0.006578 0.001126 0.019188
RoHS 50% -0.104838 -0.010862 0.001052 0.001258 0.002118 -0.001812
RoHS 100% -0.173596 -0.021705 0.001293 0.000949 0.002970 -0.004640
RoHS 200% -0.262835 -0.040507 0.001059 -0.000868 0.003413 -0.010290
ELV/RoHS 50% -0.270613 -0.028379 0.004077 0.001399 -0.000875 0.021358
ELV/RoHS 100% -0.443569 -0.043063 0.006009 0.003020 0.000795 0.022002
ELV/RoHS 200% -0.663355 -0.058543 0.007776 0.005743 0.004710 0.007946
HD
r01 r02 r03 r04 r05 r06
ELV 50% -0.152819 -0.031171 0.004258 -0.002095 -0.010852 0.038164
ELV 100% -0.299434 -0.070571 0.00776 -0.006801 -0.02029 0.092743
ELV 200% -0.563591 -0.147702 0.012535 -0.017614 -0.03124 0.205517
RoHS 50% -0.09143 -0.007022 0.001783 0.000573 -0.007655 -0.00804
RoHS 100% -0.179332 0.002959 0.005499 0.006636 -0.010004 -0.006061
RoHS 200% -0.342136 0.036756 0.01397 0.023927 -0.004155 0.01101
ELV/RoHS 50% -0.24442 -0.037995 0.006115 -0.001535 -0.018647 0.030508
ELV/RoHS 100% -0.479185 -0.066908 0.013429 0.000368 -0.030612 0.087314
ELV/RoHS 200% -0.905849 -0.108546 0.026726 0.010666 -0.036532 0.215362
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Table 3. Effects of ELV/RoHS on Selected Economic Variables when Importer’s PfV Is Not Strong (ࢼ࢏࢙ ൌ ૙. ૞) 
 
Note 1: +++ (0.20 ~), ++ (0.10 ~ 0.20), + (0.00 ~ 0.10), - (-0.10 ~ 0.00), -- (-0.20 ~ -0.10), and --- (~ -20). 
Note 2: “Welfare Level of EU” is in percentage. 
Note 3: Non-EU (EU) and i03/i04. 
Note 4: The signs for non-EU are the averages of non-EU regions.
Scenario Type Exports to EU Price of Exports to EU EU Domestic Price of EU Domestic
LU ＋＋ (－) －－ (－) (－) (－)
LI ＋ (＋) －－ (－－) (－－) (－)
LD ＋＋＋ (－) －－ (＋) (－) (＋)
LU ＋＋ (－－) －－ (－) (－－) (－)
LI ＋ (＋) －－ (－－) (－－) (－)
LD ＋＋ ＋(－－－) －－ (＋) (－－) (＋)
LU ＋＋/＋＋ (－/－) －－/－－ (－/－) (－/－－) (－/－)
LI ＋/＋ (＋/＋) －－/－－ (－－/－－) (－－/－－) (－/－)
LD ＋＋＋/＋＋＋ (－/－－) －－/－－ (＋/＋) (－/－－) (＋/＋)
Scenario Type Proportion of Firms Exporting to EU Productivity of Firms Exporting to EU Total Variety Welfare Level of EU (%)
LU －－－ (－) ＋＋＋ (＋) －－－ (－) (－)
LI －－－ (－－－) ＋＋＋ (＋＋＋) －－－ (－－－) (＋＋＋)
LD －－－ (＋＋) ＋＋ (－) －－－ (－) (－－－)
LU －－－ (－) ＋＋＋ (＋) －－－ (－) (＋)
LI －－－ (－－－) ＋＋＋ (＋＋＋) －－－ (－－－) (＋＋)
LD －－－ (＋＋) ＋＋＋ (－) －－－ (－－－) (－－)
LU －－－/－－－ (－/－) ＋＋＋/＋＋＋ (＋/＋) －－－/－－－ (－/－) (＋)
LI －－－/－－－ (－－－/－－－) ＋＋＋/＋＋＋ (＋＋＋/＋＋＋) －－－/－－－ (－－－/－－－) (＋＋＋)
LD －－－/－－－ (＋＋/＋＋) ＋＋/＋＋＋ (－/－) －－－/－－－ (－/－－) (－－－)
ELV/RoHS 200%
ELV 200%
RoHS 200%
ELV/RoHS 200%
ELV 200%
RoHS 200%
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Table 4. Welfare Effects of ELV/RoHS (ࢼ࢏࢙ ൌ ૙. ૞) 
 
  
LU
r01 r02 r03 r04 r05 r06
ELV 50% -0.001723 0.000205 0.019363 0.002544 0.015543 0.008210
ELV 100% -0.002926 0.000351 0.033805 0.004444 0.027136 0.014322
ELV 200% -0.004575 0.000557 0.055189 0.007264 0.044300 0.023355
RoHS 50% 0.010586 0.001011 0.005701 0.049562 0.043188 0.007923
RoHS 100% 0.018948 0.001732 0.009777 0.085146 0.074098 0.013598
RoHS 200% 0.032023 0.002751 0.015545 0.135715 0.117884 0.021644
ELV/RoHS 50% 0.008851 0.001219 0.024980 0.052062 0.058638 0.016112
ELV/RoHS 100% 0.015982 0.002093 0.043331 0.089466 0.100958 0.027860
ELV/RoHS 200% 0.027328 0.003338 0.070088 0.142679 0.161490 0.044849
LI
r01 r02 r03 r04 r05 r06
ELV 50% 0.074900 0.000929 0.003947 0.000501 0.002456 0.003663
ELV 100% 0.130083 0.001617 0.006405 0.000819 0.003898 0.006190
ELV 200% 0.210779 0.002628 0.009355 0.001207 0.005475 0.009640
RoHS 50% 0.050276 0.001235 0.001262 0.015680 0.013237 0.003186
RoHS 100% 0.087116 0.002118 0.002043 0.025950 0.021867 0.005331
RoHS 200% 0.140677 0.003374 0.002975 0.039175 0.032922 0.008187
ELV/RoHS 50% 0.125219 0.002164 0.005198 0.016186 0.015688 0.006849
ELV/RoHS 100% 0.217328 0.003737 0.008418 0.026780 0.025747 0.011520
ELV/RoHS 200% 0.351789 0.006010 0.012260 0.040413 0.038354 0.017827
LD
r01 r02 r03 r04 r05 r06
ELV 50% -0.080958 -0.002098 0.039387 0.00428 0.033529 0.010438
ELV 100% -0.157014 -0.00405 0.073949 0.008074 0.063083 0.01944
ELV 200% -0.296813 -0.007531 0.134991 0.014952 0.115443 0.035546
RoHS 50% -0.029997 0.000272 0.010848 0.085334 0.072823 0.011188
RoHS 100% -0.058448 0.000326 0.019783 0.155391 0.132258 0.020191
RoHS 200% -0.109889 0.000184 0.034398 0.270027 0.229006 0.034769
ELV/RoHS 50% -0.111132 -0.001824 0.050015 0.089458 0.106104 0.021546
ELV/RoHS 100% -0.216113 -0.003718 0.093005 0.162999 0.194561 0.039368
ELV/RoHS 200% -0.40897 -0.007326 0.1672 0.283854 0.342324 0.069552
 25 
 
Figure 1. Hicksian Equivalent Variations (US$ Billion) with Different Values of ࢼ࢏࢙ 
 
Note 1: Fixed exporting cost necessary to make sales on the EU (r02) market corresponding to i03 and i04 are 
raised 50% (ELV/ROHS). 
Note 2: Fixed exporting cost for the intra-EU trade is increased along within the imports from outside the EU 
(Case I). 
